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The role of an alerting system is to make the system operator (e.g., pilot) aware of an impending 
hazard or unsafe state so the hazard can be avoided or managed successfully. A review of 46 
commercial aviation accidents (between 1998 and 2014) revealed that, in the vast majority of 
events, either the hazard was not alerted or relevant hazard alerting occurred but failed to aid the 
flight crew sufficiently.  For this set of events, alerting system failures were placed in one of five 
phases: Detection, Understanding, Action Selection, Prioritization, and Execution. This study also 
reviewed the evolution of alerting system schemes in commercial aviation, which revealed naïve 
assumptions about pilot reliability in monitoring flight path parameters; specifically, pilot 
monitoring was assumed to be more effective than it actually is.  Examples are provided of the 
types of alerting system failures that have occurred, and recommendations are provided for 
alerting system improvements. 
 
 
The Role of Alerting 
 
 In any complex, safety-critical system, alerting 
should initiate the appropriate operator response to 
managing a hazard (or, more generally, an unsafe state).  
Specifically, the alert and the other elements of the 
system interface need to help the operator 
-  Orient to an important change – Some salient 
stimulus, such as a loud sound/voice or bright light, 
or both, needs to attract the operator’s attention that 
some important change has occurred requiring the 
operator’s immediate awareness. 
-  Understand the nature and urgency of that change – 
Some interface element needs to describe this 
important change.  Information about the nature of 
the change, as well as the urgency and/or the 
importance of response need to be presented clearly 
and simply.  
-  Identify appropriate actions – When there are 
operator actions that are recommended to manage 
the failure or hazard, those actions have to be 
presented to the operator (although in some cases, an 
action or small set of actions is memorized by the 
operator).  The alert needs to create a link to those 
actions, either by making them part of the alert or by 
pointing to a set of actions. 
-  Identify the priority for the actions – In some non-
normal situations, there may be a number of actions 
for the operator to take, especially when there are 
multiple alerts.  The system interface needs to aid 
the operator in assessing which actions have the 
highest priority (or the highest urgency). 
-  Execute the actions efficiently, accurately, and 
completely – The system interface and the 
operational documents need to support the operator 
in executing the prescribed actions.  In addition, the 
interface should provide clear feedback that the 
unsafe state has been resolved (or cannot be 
resolved).  
 
 These five phases represent an integrated alerting 
sequence, which can be used to identify the point at 
which alerting fails when it does not lead to successfully 
managing the situation.  For example, a flight crew may 
fail to detect an alert (perhaps because it was 
insufficiently salient), which would preclude any further 
steps to manage the hazard.   
 
How Effective is Alerting? 
  
 The design of an alerting system is evaluated during 
system (airplane) certification.  From my experience, 
that evaluation is strongly driven by subjective reviews 
from pilots/SMEs (vs empirical studies).  Further, these 
reviews place significant value on the mere presence of a 
hazard alert.  There is little formal exploration of the 
larger alerting sequence. 
 Operational experience, although slow to accrue, is 
another measure of effectiveness, and reviews of safety 
events can reveal more about the performance of alerting 
systems.  In 2010, the Commercial Aviation Safety 
Team (CAST) formed a team to review a set of 18 
accidents and incidents tied to Loss of Control (LOC). 
This review revealed that, in every event, alerting had 
failed to support the flight crew in successfully 
managing the hazard (CAST, 2014).  The question this 
raised was, “Was this relatively small sample 
representative of the full range of accidents?” 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20170011323 2019-08-31T01:26:46+00:00Z
 The goal in the present study was to review a large, 
representative set of commercial aviation accidents to 
determine whether the alerting system was effective, and 
if it was not, in what way it failed.  [Note that accident 
causality is typically complex and there is rarely (almost 
never) a single cause.  The discussion here regards the 
role that the alerting system did play as a contributor to 
the event vs what role it could have played.] 
 
Method: Event Set 
 
 A review was conducted of commercial aviation 
accidents (defined here as events with on-board 
fatalities) and seven major incidents (no fatalities but 
significant upset) to determine the effectiveness of the 
alerting system.  Initially, a list of all accidents in large, 
western-built, commercial transports from 2002 to 2014 
was developed (plus three accidents from between 1998 
and 2002 that had been analyzed by the CAST effort).  
Events were drawn from the event database at 
https://aviation-safety.net.  Events were excluded from 
this set for one of three reasons: terrorism, pilot suicide, 
or the accident report was incomplete or unavailable.  
 There were 132 accidents in the resulting set, and 
with the seven incidents, the total event set was 139 
(representing 6,052 on-board fatalities). The largest 
commercial transports—Boeing and Airbus airplanes 
and the more recent McDonnell-Douglas airplanes (DC-
9s, MD-80s, MD-11s)—made up slightly more than half 
of these events, accounting for 74 of the 139 (53%) 
events.   
 Out of this set of 139, 64 (57 accidents and 7 
incidents) were selected for review and analysis. 
Preference was given to the largest airplanes, which 
create the largest exposure for the flying public.  This set 
of 64 represents 46% of the complete set of events.  If 
one considers just the largest transports (Boeing, Airbus, 
and more-recent McDonnell-Douglas products), 57 of 
those 74 events (or 77%) were selected for analysis.  
There were two additional reasons for sampling 
primarily from these fleets:  
1. These airplanes are more likely to have more 
complete and better-integrated alerting systems,  
2. The accident reports are more likely to be 
thorough and more easily accessed.   
 
The 64 selected events represent 4,020 fatalities, which 
is 66% of the total fatalities in the 139 events.   
 
Method: Analysis Procedure 
 
 For this study, a hazard is defined as an undesirable 
airplane condition/state that has been alerted in some 
airplane designs.  The hazards considered for this study 
are the following 
-  Bank angle – The airplane rolled (or was rolled) 
beyond 45° into a loss of control (LOC) situation 
that was not recovered. 
- Low airspeed – Airspeed dropped below normal 
operating speeds. 
- Approach to stall – Airspeed dropped even lower 
and/or airplane angle of attack increased to a point 
where the airplane was close to stalling (or stalls). 
- Ground proximity – The airplane flew near terrain 
(when it was not landing). 
- Landing configuration / High-energy approach – The 
airplane landed fast and/or the approach was above 
the glidepath or fast, and it became very difficult to 
manage the landing. 
- Take-off configuration – The airplane was not 
properly configured for take-off, leading to 
insufficient lift to fly at the expected take-off speed. 
- Cabin altitude – Pressure was not maintained in the 
airplane as it climbed, and the airplane could not 
sustain human life. 
- Unreliable airspeed – Airspeed indication became 
erroneous due to a fault in air data; at least one of the 
airspeed indicators became invalid. 
- Take-off performance – There was insufficient thrust 
for take-off with the available runway length. 
- Autothrottle disengagement – The autothrottle 
disengaged (without pilot input) and the pilot failed 
to manage thrust. 
- Engine out – Loss of an engine. 
 
 For each of the 64 events, I identified the hazards 
that were present (from the list above), the hazards that 
led to the accident, the airplane alerts that occurred, and 
the flight crew’s response to any alerting (a description 
of their actions compared to the actions that would have 
been expected).  These data are taken from the 
descriptions in the accident report.  In some accidents, 
multiple hazards—e.g., low airspeed and approach to 
stall—were present in the event.  There was no re-
analysis of the accident; that is, the information in the 
accident report was treated as accurate.   
 More specifically, the analysis determined if the 
alerting system failed in one of the following ways: 
- Alert Absent / Fail to detect the alert or hazard – 
Many of these were cases in which there was no 
alert for the hazard (or the alert malfunctioned).  Or, 
the flight crew or the pilot was seemingly unaware 
that an alert had occurred (their behavior did not 
reveal an awareness).  Note that Table 1 splits out 
these into two categories. 
- Alert not understood – These were cases in which 
the flight crew or pilot was aware there had been an  
Hazard No Alert Detect Understand Select 
Action 
Prioritize Execution  
Low Airspeed 8 3     11 
Approach to Stall    9  4 13 
Bank Angle 1  1 4     6 
Unrel Airspeed   1 2     3 
Ground Prox 4 5 3    12 
Cabin Altitude   1      1 
High-energy 
Approach 
1 2       3 
A/T Disengage  1       1 
TO Performance 2        2 
TO Configuration 1        1 
Engine Out    1     1 
 17 11 6 16 0 4 54 
 
Table 1.  Categorization of Alerting Failures (Note: some events had two hazards to alert)
alert, but they did not understand what the hazard 
was. 
- Fail to select the appropriate action – These were 
cases in which the flight crew or pilot took 
inappropriate actions—actions different from what  
would be expected in the hazard situation.  In some 
cases, these were opposite actions, such as roll the 
wrong way.  In other cases, the flight crew had not 
been trained on the correct action. 
- Fail to assign high priority to the alert – These were 
cases in which the alert or the alert response was not 
given sufficiently high priority. 
- Fail to execute the appropriate response – These 
were cases where the flight crew or pilot understood 
what the response should be but their response was 
poorly performed.   
 
The categorization of each event is described in the more 
complete technical report (Mumaw, 2017). 
 
Results 
  
[Note that the analysis, at the time of this writing (June, 
2017), was complete for 46 of the 64 accidents; the 
complete analysis appears in a NASA technical report.] 
 Table 1 shows the resulting categorization of 
alerting system failures in 42 events [Note that, of the 46 
events analyzed, only four had no alerting issues!].  The 
following paragraphs break out the types of failures 
encountered for some of the hazards (when there were 
multiple events). 
 There were 11 low-airspeed situations in this set.  
For seven of the events (five accidents and two 
incidents), there was no alerting for the low-airspeed 
situation.  In another event, the alert malfunctioned and 
did not occur.  And, in the last three events, the visual-
only alert was not detected by the flight crew.  For all of 
these, alerting failed because there was no alert, or the 
alert was not detected. 
 Nine of these 11 events transitioned from low 
airspeed to an approach-to-stall situation and alert (and 
there were four other events that had a stick shaker for a 
total of 13).  These failed in a different way.  For nine of 
these 13, the pilot flying (PF) responded to the stick 
shaker in a manner quite different from the way he 
should have responded.  In some of these cases, this may 
have been tied to inadequate training on these types of 
situations.  In two cases, there was no training at all on 
responding to a stall warning.  In two of the remaining 
four cases, the pilot inadvertently got into an autoflight 
mode that prevented an effective response.  In the last 
two cases, the pilot was in a difficult-to-manage 
situation and handled it poorly.  So, unlike low airspeed, 
of which the pilot was unaware, stick shaker made the 
pilot aware of the situation.  He just did not handle that 
situation well enough to recover.   
 Bank angle accidents were more diverse; there were 
six events.  In one accident, there was no alert.  In 
another accident, an alert came on, was silenced by one 
of the pilots, and then was unheeded.  Perhaps the pilots 
did not understand the alert.  In the last four events, the 
pilot did not understand what actions fit the situation and 
rolled the airplane away from wings-level and into a loss 
of control.   
 There were three events involving unreliable 
airspeed, two incidents and one accident.  In one of 
these, the flight crew did not understand the situation 
and chased the bad airspeed.  In the other two events, the 
crew knew that they had airspeed issues but failed to link 
to the appropriate checklist. 
 The ground proximity hazard led to 12 events.  As 
with low airspeed, some of these went unalerted.  Older 
Ground Proximity Warning Systems (GPWS) failed to 
pick up approaching terrain in certain situations and 
failed to alert.  A more interesting finding are the five 
events in which the flight crew kept flying toward the 
terrain even though the GPWS alert was active.  This is 
perhaps due to a cognitive tunneling (or fixation) that 
seemed to be a failure to detect the alert (Dehais et al., 
2014).  Finally, in three other cases, the crew seemed 
aware of the GPWS alert but made an inadequate 
response to it; perhaps not fully understanding where 
they were relative to the terrain. 
 The high-energy approach hazard showed some 
similar failures.  For two of these three events, the flight 
crew continued on despite continuous alerting (cognitive 
tunneling, or perhaps a conscious decision to ignore the 
alert because they thought they were managing it).  For 
the other event, it got into a landing configuration 
condition that was not alerted. 
 
Discussion 
 
 The analysis presented here demonstrates that the 
presence of a hazard alert is not always sufficient to 
initiate an effective response.  To be fair, this analysis 
focused on only one leg of the three-legged stool: 
alerting system design, operator training, and non-
normal procedure design.  However, design is typically 
the biggest driver for shaping reliable operator 
performance over the long term. 
 It is also important to note that it is difficult to 
extract data on how frequently these alerts are handled 
well, and, thus, we cannot know the overall level of 
flight crew reliability. Certainly, the fatal accident rate is 
quite low, but while significant failures are relatively 
rare, there is value in a thorough analysis of failures in 
alerting system design.  For example, it is noteworthy 
that for 17 of the 46 events analyzed, there was no alert 
for the hazard that led to the accident.  For the 25 events 
for which there was hazard alerting, the reasons for 
failure were varied, covering much of the full range of 
the performance cycle (Rasmussen, 1983).   
 The evolution in alerting across generations of 
airplanes is an important element of the story. 
 
The Evolution of Alerts 
 
 An airplane can be in service 30 years or more and 
older technology remains in the operating fleet even 
when new innovations improve safety.  Alerting 
schemes, like many other elements of the flight deck 
interface, have evolved over time and alerts were 
sometimes added in a piecemeal manner.  In fact, many 
of the airplanes involved in the events where there was 
no alerting were airplanes designed pre-1990.  
 For Boeing airplanes, there was a significant 
advance in alerting in the early 1980s (with the 757/767 
joint entry into service) with the introduction of a 
centralized alerting system (the EICAS display in 
Boeing airplanes; the ECAM display in Airbus 
airplanes).  Centralized alerting meant that, instead of 
alerts being distributed around the flight deck interface, 
they were presented on a single display placed in a 
forward area visible to both pilots.  This change was in 
response to a proliferation of airplane system alerts in 
the previous generation (see Boucek et al., 1977).   
 However, this central alerting advance was applied 
only to airplane system failures, such as hydraulic 
system or electrical system failures.  Flight path 
management hazards, on the other hand, continued to 
evolve without the level of integration brought to the 
airplane system alerts.  Flight path-related alerts such as 
TCAS RAs, windshear, ground proximity, low airspeed, 
bank angle, and stall warning are related in that they all 
require the pilot to make flight control inputs.  However, 
in even the newest generation of jet transports, pilots are 
alerted to these conditions using a mix of voices, sounds, 
master lights, visual alerts, and visual situation 
information (typically communicated through the 
Primary Flight Display (PFD), Navigational Display 
(ND) or other, more isolated lights near those displays). 
There are also differences in how guidance information 
is provided, or even if flight control guidance is 
provided.  
 For Boeing airplanes, the following describes the 
time course of alert evolution for a sample of alerts: 
- Cabin altitude, which should be alerted at the 
warning level (two modalities), was alerted as a horn 
only in the 737 models and the early 747s.  For the 
737, it was 2011 before a light was added to help 
distinguish this alert from the Take-off 
Configuration alert (motivated by a 2005 accident). 
- There was initially no alerting for bank angle 
(exceeding 35° of roll) in airplanes that went into 
service prior to 1989.  Most of these airplanes were 
offered an option to install an aural only alert (for a 
caution-level alert) in 1987.  After 1989, airplanes 
entering service had the necessary aural (voice) and 
visual (PFD indications).  An alert with flight 
control guidance was not developed until 2016 (see 
Ewbank et al., 2016). 
- There was initially no alerting for low airspeed, 
which should be a caution-level alert, on the early 
737s. For airplanes that went into service in 1982 
(but also the later 737 NG in 1998), there was only a 
visual indication on the airspeed indicator on the 
PFD.  The appropriate two-modality scheme arrived 
in 1989 with the 747-400. 
- The approach to stall alert has always been a two-
modality alert, from the very first Boeing 737 
models.  The early airplanes (737 and 747 classics) 
presented just the stick shaker (tactile and aural, and 
salient).  PFD indications (visual) were added in 
1982. 
- Unreliable airspeed has always been a difficult 
situation to alert.  There was no alert at all until 1989 
for this caution-level alert.  Some visual alerting was 
provided in the mid-1990s.  The 737 Classic and NG 
never went beyond this visual-only scheme.  True 
two-modality alerting arrived in 1997 for the other 
airplanes.   
 
 The lesson to be drawn from these time histories of 
individual alerts is that flight path management alerting 
has evolved in a fragmented manner; it has yet to be 
integrated like airplane system failures were.  A 
significant contributor to this outcome was a belief that 
pilots were monitoring flight path effectively; that is, 
pilots were believed to be on top of airspeed, bank angle, 
angle of attack, and unreliable airspeed.  It was assumed 
that pilots would notice these deviations and manage the 
situation appropriately.  Accidents have shown this 
assumption to be generous for many operations, and 
recently, there is a new awareness regarding the 
weaknesses in pilot monitoring (e.g., CAA, 2013).  
Alerting schemes for flight path management have not 
yet evolved to reflect this new understanding. 
 
Conclusions 
 
This review of a large, representative set of recent 
commercial aviation accidents revealed that, for the 
operational fleet, there are still situations in which the 
alerting system fails to lead to successful management of 
the hazard.  A failure in alerting (broadly defined here) 
contributed to 42 of 46 accidents!   
 Some of the alerting issues uncovered by this review 
have been addressed in newer airplanes through 
improved technology (e.g., unreliable airspeed).  
However, airplanes with older technology will remain in 
the operating fleet for years to come and vulnerabilities 
remain. 
 Only be studying the performance of alerting 
systems in the events in which they failed can we 
identify the types of alerting system design changes that 
are needed.  A significant factor to consider in this 
evaluation is that flight path management alerting is a 
product of a less integrated approach to alerting than is 
airplane system alerting.  One reason for this more 
piecemeal approach was the set of assumptions about the 
effectiveness of pilot monitoring of flight path.   
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